

00843

1962/10/28

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State *Cub* *W# 2*
EYES ONLY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Control: 19392

SS

Rec'd: October 28, 1962
2:01 a.m.

Info

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 902, October 28, 1 p.m.

FILE

*Cy 12 Negatives
10/30*

NIACT

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Department telegram 1055

Pursuant Martin telecon Saturday 2145 instructing to proceed on reference telegram, I contacted Hermes Lima and visited him at home from 2330 to 0030. Began by saying this extremely important and sensitive diplomatic initiative being made under direct instructions of Secretary and requiring utmost secrecy, with perhaps vital bearing on peace. Related substance introductory paragraph, emphasizing that talk must be with Fidel alone, and that instructions must go by courier direct to Bastian Pinto. Then gave him Portuguese translation eight numbered points, typed on plain paper.

Hermes replied that he had been peppering Bastian Pinto with instructions, most recent being 3 a.m. telecon Saturday, to say to Cubans that they must accept UN observers and must dismantle bases, and that if this done, GOB would do all in power to assure political and military safety of regime. Emphasized that in present world conditions no sense in harping on infringement sovereignty, and that removal bases would permit Cubans to pursue their revolution in tranquility as purely domestic concern. Hermes had received telegram from Habana about 10 p.m. reporting Bastian talk with Roa in which latter said Cuban invitation to U Thant to visit had been heavily influenced by GOB representations.

Hermes felt

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958, Sec. 5
31st October 6/96

By *MMK* NARA Date *1/14*

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-2- 902, October 28, 1 p.m., from Rio de Janeiro

Hermes felt that new suggestion was a perfectly natural supplement to what they had been doing and said he would undertake it. I pointed out certain essential differences, notably effort to appeal personally to Fidel to divorce himself from Soviet control, referring to our previous talks with Dantas and to evidences some months back of friction between Fidel and Russians. Hermes appeared to understand fully, remarking that position like Tito's was far better for Fidel than that of Janos Kadar or Grotewohl, and that if Fidel had any statesmanship he would be most interested. Said that Lenin in similar circumstances would remove Soviet bases and Russian military personnel forthwith. I emphasized that Khrushchev speech Saturday should be final proof to Fidel that Soviets interested only in using Cuba to pursue own security interests, while creating new dangers for Cuba.

Hermes then said he considered General Albino Silva, new chief of military household, as best courier. He undertook to discuss early Sunday with Goulart, who returns from Brasilia during course of tonight, with view to getting Albino onto special courier plan as soon as possible. Said NEW YORK TIMES and Sunday's Rio press would be carrying reports about general line of Brazilian representations to Cuba, which would make follow-up by special courier seem natural, although he emphasized that despatching of Albino would not be publicized. I emphasized once again extreme importance of avoiding any indication that this our idea, and he promised no word would be said to reveal origin. Promised to advise me on action taken.

GORDON

LM

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EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS

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GORDON

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Note: Advance copies to SS/DO, SS/O.

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